Rapidly Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning: Amnesics Learn Quickly and Happy People Slowly by Dienes, Zoltan et al.
Rapidly Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning:
Amnesics Learn Quickly and Happy People Slowly
Zoltan Dienes
1*, Roland J. Baddeley
2, Ashok Jansari
3
1School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom, 2School of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom, 3School of
Psychology, University of East London, London, United Kingdom
Abstract
Background: We introduce a method for quickly determining the rate of implicit learning.
Methodology/Principal Findings: The task involves making a binary prediction for a probabilistic sequence over 10
minutes; from this it is possible to determine the influence of events of a different number of trials in the past on the current
decision. This profile directly reflects the learning rate parameter of a large class of learning algorithms including the delta
and Rescorla-Wagner rules. To illustrate the use of the method, we compare a person with amnesia with normal controls
and we compare people with induced happy and sad moods.
Conclusions/Significance: Learning on the task is likely both associative and implicit. We argue theoretically and
demonstrate empirically that both amnesia and also transient negative moods can be associated with an especially large
learning rate: People with amnesia can learn quickly and happy people slowly.
Citation: Dienes Z, Baddeley RJ, Jansari A (2012) Rapidly Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning: Amnesics Learn Quickly and Happy People Slowly. PLoS
ONE 7(3): e33400. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033400
Editor: Leonardo Fontenelle, Institute of Psychiatry at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Received September 23, 2011; Accepted February 13, 2012; Published March 23, 2012
Copyright:  2012 Dienes et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The work was partly supported by Economic and Social Research (ESRC) (http://www.esrc.ac.uk/) grant RES-062-23-1975 to the first author. The funders
had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. No additional external funding was received for
this study.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: dienes@sussex.ac.uk
Introduction
The process by which we can incidentally acquire knowledge of
the structure of the environment without being aware of the
knowledge is called implicit learning [1,2]. Implicit learning is a
fundamental process involved in mastering music, languages,
social and cultural rules, perceptual-motor skills, and almost any
domain involving the gradual refinement of judgment or action
[3,4]. Implicit learning is normally investigated by requiring
people to learn complex structures, like finite state grammars or
complex control systems [5]. Such tasks are ill-suited for
determining an individual’s effective learning rate, because a
neural network or other model will typically have an optimal
learning rate in the middle of its range with either a very high or
very low learning rate producing slower learning overall for the
system on such complex tasks [6]. Perhaps for this reason,
researchers have not systematically addressed the question of what
factors influence implicit learning rate per se, despite the
fundamental nature of the question (though cf [7] outside the
context of implicit learning paradigms).
We introduce a task to measure the learning rate of a person
quickly and simply. A fast or large learning rate means, by
definition, that each trial changes strength of prediction by a large
amount, and thus recent trials will have a large influence on the
current prediction. Consequently, more distant trials will have a
relatively smaller influence. Conversely, a small (slow) learning rate
means, by definition, that each trial introduces a small change to
strength of predictions, prior knowledge is changed only
marginally, and distant trials will have a relatively strong influence
on current predictions. Thus, for example, on a simple
conditioning task, a large learning rate corresponds to learning
the simple association quickly.
In our task, the participant makes a series of binary predictions,
e.g. whether a probabilistic stimulus will appear on the left or the
right. Our sequences were all in fact random. Despite the random
nature of the sequence, a learning device will on any given trial be
influenced by the idiosyncratic pattern of past trials to have an
expectation of right or left. We correlate what the participant
predicts on a trial with what happened one trial back, two trials
back, etc. The random nature of the sequence means each of these
correlations is independent. That is, each correlation directly
indicates the influence of events a given number of steps in the past
on current predictions regardless of what happened on any other
number of steps into the past. If a manipulation increases learning
rate it will show in the plot of correlations against number of trials
into the past: Correlations of the current prediction with recent
trials will increase and correlations of the current prediction with
distant trials will decrease. The simplicity of the task is what allows
it to be a tool for clearly measuring learning rate.
In the first two experiments we demonstrate relevant properties
of our method as a measure of implicit learning rate, namely that it
involves associative learning rather than simply conceptual
priming, and it also involves the phenomenology of guessing,
characteristic of implicit learning. In the second two experiments
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domains, showing how it sheds light on amnesia and also on the
way emotional stimuli influence learning. Knowing learning rates
can allow surprising conclusions in a range of psychological
domains.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 explored whether the learning on the task was
associative or involved just conceptual priming of ‘‘left’’ or ‘‘right’’.
We tested the associative nature of learning on the task by having a
distinctive context (a tone) associated with most trials, but absent
on every fourth trial. In classical conditioning, more salient stimuli
acquire more associative strength than less salient stimuli, a
phenomenon called over-shadowing [8]. Less salient stimuli may
acquire very little associative strength because of the presence of a
salient stimulus. Thus, if people are learning to associate
contextual cues with the prediction for left or right, removing
salient cues should reduce the reliance of the prediction on past
trials. That is, if associative learning has occurred, then there
should be a weaker dependency of predictions on past trials for no
tone trials than for tone trials.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-four students from the University of
Sussex participated. The protocol used in this and subsequent
experiments was approved by the University of Sussex School of
Psychology Research Governance Committee following the
guidelines for human research of the British Psychological
Society. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants in all experiments.
Procedure. On each trial the word ‘‘ready’’ was first
displayed for 400 ms. On tone trials, there was a simultaneous
500 Hz tone; ‘ready’ was displayed in white Sanserif Turbopascal
size 8 font. By contrast, every fourth trial had no tone (that is,
there were always three tone trials between every no-tone trial),
and ‘ready’ was displayed in yellow Gothic size 4 font. Participants
were then instructed to press Z or M to predict left or right
respectively, which they did in their own time. A square was
displayed randomly on the left or right for 400 ms; on tone trials it
was coloured blue and on no tone trials it was yellow. Finally there
was a wait of 800 ms to make sure the tone of the next trial was
heard as a warning for that trial and not a response to the previous
one. There were 300 trials in total. Each participant experienced a
different random sequence.
Results and Discussion
In experiment 1 participants were presented with a majority of
trials involving a tone accompanying the ready prompt and in
some trials the tone was missing. Figures 1 and 2 show the Pearson
(i.e. phi) correlation of current prediction with where the square
actually was from one to ten trials back for experiment 1. For
example, for one trial back, the correlation shows how strongly
what happened on the just preceding trial influenced the
prediction on the current trial. Note that this is not the influence
of the subject’s prediction in the previous trial on the current
prediction - but the influence of where the square actually just was
in the previous trial on the current prediction. If the learning rate
was one, a single trial would result in maximum associative
strength for whatever just happened, and so prediction would
correlate one with the event one trial back. With a learning rate of
one, if the square had been on the right on the previous trial, the
subject would predict right 100% of the time on the next trial (and
the same for left). Thus, of necessity, the correlation with all trials
more than one trial back would be zero. On the other hand, if the
learning rate was less than one, the correlation with events one
trial back would be less than one, and events further back could
influence prediction. Thus, the profile of influence over time gives
information about learning rate. Further, only with a learning rate
of zero would there be no influence on any trial; thus a general
influence from the trials overall indicates learning occurred.
Figure 1 shows the data for tone trials and Figure 2 for no tone
trials. The average correlation of predictions with what happened
for trials one to ten back was detectably higher for tone trials (.03,
SD=.04) than no tone trials (.01, SD=.07), t(33)=2.03, p=.05,
dz=0.35, supporting the claim that learning in the task is
associative. On the tone trials, overall the correlations were above
chance, t(33)=3.77, p=.001, 95% CI [.013, .043], showing that
overall people were influenced by past trials; conversely, for the no
tone trials the correlations were not on average detectably above
chance, t(33)=.96, p=.35, 95% CI [–.013, .036]. While the latter
result may be due to the larger standard errors for the no tone
trials, the difference between tone and no trials cannot be due to
larger standard errors in the latter, as the difference is significant.
In sum, people’s learning was influenced by context with evidence
of learning particularly when the context was relatively common.
If learning on the task consisted merely of non-associative priming
of the abstract concepts of left and right (i.e. if seeing something on
the left primed a tendency to respond left regardless of context)
then the presence or not of a tone would be irrelevant. Associative
learning predicts an influence of context, as we found.
The results do not illuminate the basis of the associative
learning, for example whether based on exemplar coding of a
whole trial (e.g. tone plus side of square) (cf [9]) rather than a
strength-based mechanism (like Rescorla Wagner). We can be sure
that whatever the context-linking mechanism, however, it involves
developing sensitivity to several trials in the past, so is not based on
a memory of just one trial back (contrast [10]).
[11] and [12] used a similar task as ours, but with a reaction
time measure of learning. Participants had to press a button when
a stimulus appeared, which could be indicated by a tone. [12]
argued (contrary to [11]) that rather than associative learning,
response priming could account for the RT benefits, i.e. people press
a button faster when they have just pressed it. While this is a
possible explanation in their task, in the current task subjects make
a prediction about a random stimulus so repeating the response of
the previous trial would not produce any sensitivity of the current
response to the stimulus location on the previous trial. Yet what we
show is strong sensitivity of the current response to what the
stimulus was on the just previous trial. Thus, this sensitivity cannot
be response priming.
A weakness of the method is illustrated by the negative
correlation three time steps back. Associative learning would only
produce positive correlations. [13] found that when people were
asked to predict a binary event (presence or absence of an air puff),
such predictions were susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy, even
when an eye-blink response showed standard conditioning. That
is, the more often an air puff followed a tone, the less subjects
expected it after a tone. Figure 1 illustrates that for the conditions
of our method (including the rapid time scales: [13] had an
interval of 10 seconds between trials instead of less than a second
we used), the gambler’s fallacy is swamped by a process producing
positive correlations, except for three trials back. Nonetheless, the
contribution of the gambler’s fallacy to our findings is an
important issue which we consider again in the discussion, with
additional analyses.
Indeed, an alternative interpretation of the difference between
tone and no trials is that the diminished sensitivity to past trials in
Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning
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enhanced gambler’s fallacy tendency on no tone versus tone trials.
However, a change in context has been found to reduce the
tendency to use the gambler’s fallacy (with a coin toss) [14],
rendering gambler’s fallacy a less plausible explanation of
experiment 1.
As the structure to be learned is minimal (i.e. the sequence is
random) people are learning spurious correlations when they
become sensitive to past trials. In order to show that learning does
occur on the task when there is real long term structure, 60 subjects
were ran on the task (all trials no tones) where the probability
systematically changed over trials. Specifically, for half the
participants, for the first 120 trials the probability of left was 60%,
then for 40 trials it was 50%; then for 120 trials it was 40%; for the
other half of the participants the blocks occurred in reverse order.
While people did not probability match perfectly, there was a 9%
change in the actual probability of the stimulus occurring on the left
or right in the final rather than first block, the probability of people’s
responses changed by 6% in the appropriate direction, t(59)=4.09,
p,.0005, illustrating that people do learn structure in the task.
Experiment 2
In experiment 2 we sought to determine the implicit nature of the
knowledge. Implicit learning is a process by which people acquire
knowledge of the structure of an environment without being aware
of what that knowledge is [15]. In addition, implicit learning
involves not only unconscious structural knowledge but also on
occasion, produced by that structural knowledge, expectations
which peopleareunawareofhaving[16–18].Thus,inexperiment 2
we determined if people were aware of having any knowledge.
Methods
Participants. Fifty participants were recruited from the
University of Sussex students and alumni to obtain a range of
ages (20 to 67) so that any effect of age on the task could be
controlled for when investigating amnesia below. These
participants are the normal controls for the amnesic patient in
experiment 3, and discussed further below.
Procedure. T h et i m i n g sw e r et h es a m ea si ne x p e r i m e n t1 .A f t e r
‘ready’ was displayed for 400 ms (no tone was sounded), participants
were instructed to press the X key if they purely guessed left; Z if they
had any confidence in a left prediction; N if they purely guess right;
and Mif they had any confidenceintheir right prediction.Participants
were told that despite the fact that the sequence was random they may
develop expectations of left or right; if they are aware of any
expectations they should indicate some confidence.
Results and Discussion
Experiment2askedpeopleabouttheirphenomenology.Ifpeople
aresometimes unawareofexpectations people shouldbe influenced
by past trials when they believe they are purely guessing. In
experiment 2, people said they were guessing on 66% (SD=24.5%)
of trials. On those trials, predictions were influenced by past trials,
the average correlation of predictions with what happened for trials
one to ten back was .02 (SD=.04), significantly above zero,
t(49)=2.64, p=.011, d=0.37. On trials in which people were sure,
the average correlation was .00 (SD=.08).
In the applications to particular domains below we will
distinguish between recent and distant influences on current
predictions. To provide a measure of recent influences, the
correlations of current prediction with past occurrences of the
square for one and two trials back were averaged together. To
provide a measure of distant influences, the correlations for four to
ten trials into the past were averaged together. The division is
based on the predominance of the gambler’s fallacy at three trials
back only. We use the same division in the remaining experiments.
When people said they were guessing, the mean level of recent
influence was .07 (SE=.018), significantly different from zero,
Figure 1. Results for testing whether learning is associative. Correlation of current prediction with what happened on the nth trial in the past
plotted against trials into the past (n). Figure 1 shows the data for tone trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033400.g001
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influence was .01 (SE=.005), significantly different from zero
t(49)=2.17, p=.035, d=.31. Thus, people showed significant
learning of both recent and distant events even when they thought
they were purely guessing. The corresponding figures for when
people were partially sure for recent and distant influences were
.06 (.035) and .00 (.01).
Experiment 4 provided further data on people’s learning when
they believed they had used guessing or intuition, using different
stimuli than experiment 2. In Experiment 4 it is argued that mood
will affect learning, and either a happy or a sad mood was induced.
Only the sad condition is analysed here because the happy
condition eliminated any clear signs of learning overall. Partici-
pants reported guessing or using intuition on 65% (SD=25.3%) of
trials indicating the phenomenology characteristic of implicit
learning on a majority of trials. On those trials, predictions were
influenced by past trials, the average correlation of predictions
with what happened for trials one to ten back was .02 (SD=.03),
significantly above zero, t(26)=2.77, d=0.53, p=.01. On trials in
which people were using rules or recollections, the average
correlation was .00 (SD=.10).
In sum, a majority of trials involved a phenomenology
characteristic of implicit learning, i.e. feelings of guessing or of
intuition, while demonstrating sensitivity to structure. Having
established that the method does measure the rate of specifically
implicit learning, we turn now to consider two applications of the
method.
Experiment 3
In experiment 3 we applied the method to understanding
amnesia. People with anterograde amnesia, following damage to
the temporal lobes and underlying regions, have difficulty creating
new explicit long-term memories resulting in major impairments
in recalling post-morbid events. Nonetheless, they can be near
normal in acquiring procedural skills [19]. A standard explanation
is that there are different memory systems, for example a
procedural one and also an episodic or declarative one, and
people with anterograde amnesia have damage only to the latter
[20]. Another explanation is that damage to the temporal lobes
changes the learning rate of a single system (or at least of a relevant
system). Two possibilities are that amnesia is a result of (1) an
increase or (2) a decrease in learning rate compared to normal. We
consider each possibility in turn.
Perhaps people with amnesia have a small learning rate on all
tasks [21–23]. Thus, they cannot perform one-shot learning like
storing one-off episodes in their life, but they can still fine tune
procedural skills over many trials, which requires a small learning
rate. Shanks and his colleagues have simulated learning in
complex tasks and fitted the data by assigning people with
amnesia a lower learning rate than healthy controls. This evidence
is suggestive but depends on complex tasks where performance can
be made worse by either an increase or a decrease in learning rate
from its optimal value. Here we explore the relation between
amnesia and learning rate using our method where there is a more
transparent relation between data and learning rate.
While the hypothesis that amnesia is associated with as small
learning rate seems plausible, it has some counter-intuitive
consequences. If amnesia is associated with a smaller learning
rate, each new trial makes a small contribution to associative
strength, so associative strength depends on a proportionately
greater influence of past trials. In that sense, learning rate is a
measure of memory into the past: The smaller the learning rate,
the longer the memory into the past. On these grounds one might
expect that amnesia is associated with a large learning rate:
Responses depend mainly on only the last trial or two and hence
Figure 2. Results for testing whether learning is associative. Correlation of current prediction with what happened on the nth trial in the past
plotted against trials into the past (n). Figure 2 shows no tone trials. Figure 2 is based on fewer trials than 1, hence the wider confidence intervals. The
overall level of correlation is detectably stronger for Figure 1 rather than 2, indicating context is important.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033400.g002
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1, current predictions would depend completely on the one
previous trial and memory would go only one time step into the
past.
It is likely people adjust learning rates to different tasks. In a task
with the random structure we used, there is no ‘‘optimal’’ learning
rate: all strategies will lead to the same performance. In a slowly
changing world, small learning rates will average out the noise by
taking into account many trials, and in a quickly changing world, a
faster learning arte will more effectively track these changes. Thus
we expect normal people to have relatively small learning rates on
our task. The question is whether amnesic people will have a small
learning rate on this task also.
Methods
Participants. JC is discussed in chapter 4 of [24], referred to
as case ‘‘Jay’’. JC suffered an aneurysm at the age of 20, resulting
in severe anterograde with virtually non-existent retrograde
amnesia. An MRI scan indicates lesions are restricted to the
hippocampal area. On the Wechsler Memory Scale, immediate
recall is 8 (normal) and delayed recall is 0 (severely impaired). He is
severely impaired also on the Rivermead Behavioural Memory
Test and recall of the Rey-Osterreith Complex Figure. By
contrast, recall of childhood and (pre-morbid) early adult life is
normal.
At the time of testing JC was 42 years old. We recruited 30
University of Sussex students and alumni to create an even spread
of ages from around 20 s to 60 s; mean age was 40.1 years
(SD=15.8), range 20 to 67. The correlation of recent influences
with age was .05, not detectably different from zero, 95% CI [–.40,
.32]. The correlation of distant influences with age was –.26, also
not detectably different from zero, 95% CI [–.57, .11]. To increase
power for comparing with JC, this sample was combined with
another of 20 Sussex students, aged in their 20 s, and the
combined sample of 50 students and alumni used as the controls
for JC. Note that as JC was a University student when he suffered
his aneurysm, all controls were University educated.
Procedure. The same procedure as experiment 2 was used.
JC performed the task on 18 separate days, for 300 trials on each
day. Each control participant performed the task once, for
300 trials.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 3 tested a dense amnesiac, JC, and matched
controls. Figures 3 and 4 show the profile of correlations of current
predictions with what happened for from one to ten trials into the
past for JC and the normal controls in experiment 3. The pattern
is consistent with JC having a large rather than small learning rate.
The strength of recent influences (as defined above) was stronger
for JC (.25, SD=.13) than for controls (.09, SD=.13), t(66)=4.56,
p,.0005, d=1.24, while the strength of distant influences (as
defined above) was stronger for controls (.01, SD=.03) than for JC
(–.01, SD=.02), t(66)=2.73, p=.008, d=0.79. The data provide
impressive support for the theory that people with amnesia, at least
on this task, have an exceptionally high learning rate, and against
the theory that people with amnesia have a generalised low
learning rate. Note the evidence applies separately for recent and
distant trials: One cannot try to e.g. explain away the evidence just
for recent trials because the distant trials also provide evidence that
JC has an especially large learning rate (and vice versa).
Other paradigms have found a range of results for the rate of
conditioning for people with amnesia. For example, people with
amnesia can show slower trace eye blink conditioning compared to
controls [25], and equivalent delay eye blink conditioning [26].
Thus, we do not claim that people with amnesia have a
generalised large learning rate, nor that a single system explains
human learning (e.g. see [27] and [28] for dual systems
approaches to learning in general). Our working hypothesis is
that people normally do not have a fixed learning rate, but adjust
according to how slowly the world appears to be changing and the
amount of noise that needs to be averaged out. In a noisy slowly
changing world small learning rates are optimal because they
average the noise out of as many trials as possible. In normal
people, learning may proceed by selecting from multiple learning
devices for the one with the most effective learning rate for the task
at hand (cf [7]). Thus, normals have a relatively low learning rate
on the current task (random probability structure static over many
trials), but a relatively large learning over a few conditioning trials
with a clear signal. People with amnesia may be more rigid in the
learning rate they can settle on. The task we have introduced
provides a simple environment in which such issues can be
explored.
Experiment 4
In experiment 4 we applied the method to understanding the
role of emotion in learning. According to the ‘‘affect as
information’’ hypothesis [29–30] mild transient affective feelings
arising with the performance of a task may be experienced as
feedback about one’s performance. Success feedback should lead
to use of prior knowledge and failure feedback to learning [31–
32]. For example, people surreptitiously induced to be sad rather
than happy rely more on stereotypes in social judgments. If the
‘‘affect as information’’ argument applies to implicit learning,
then a surreptitious induction of a sad mood should indicate to
the learning system that what it knows is not working: It can’t rely
on prior knowledge but needs to attend to the present. That is a
sad rather than happy mood should be associated with a larger
learning rate. Similarly, according to the theory, happy moods
lead to more global processing and more integration [33]; i.e.
happy moods should lead to a small learning rate, involving a
greater integration of information over time.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-seven participants from the University
of Sussex participated in the sad condition and 29 in the happy.
Procedure. In this experiment the random stimulus to be
predicted was a face, which appeared on the left or right of the
screen. The same timings were used as in the previous experiments
on half the trials. On these trials an emotionally neutral male or
female face was used as the stimulus. The remaining half of the
trials (randomly intermixed with the neutral trials) were the mood
inducing trials. The neutral trials were inserted to decrease
habituation to the mood inducing stimuli. On the mood trials, the
word ‘ready’ was displayed for 200 ms, the word ‘sad’ or ‘happy’
(depending on group) was displayed for 100 ms, then the word
‘ready’ was displayed for 200 ms (thus, the word ‘ready’ was
displayed for 400 ms altogether, as in the previous experiments).
The neutral face was displayed (on the left or right) for 200 ms,
then either a sad or happy face (depending on group) was
displayed for 150 ms, and the neutral face again for 200 ms. All
faces were equally likely to be male or female.
On all trials, participants were instructed to press the X key if
they chose left because they were purely guessing or using
intuition; Z if they using some conscious rule or recollection of a
pattern to predict it will appear on the left; N for choosing right on
the basis of guessing or intuition; and M for choosing right on the
basis of a rule or recollection.
Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning
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how happy, sad, and alert they felt.
Results and Discussion
In experiment 4, we investigated the effect of mood on learning
rate. Mood valence was measured by subtracting the sad rating
from the happy rating. Participants in the happy condition had a
more positive valence (3.1, SD=3.0) than those in the sad
condition (1.0, SD=3.0), t(50)=2.58, p=.013, d=0.72. Usefully,
participants in the happy condition were not detectably different in
alertness (4.2, SD=2.0) than those in the sad condition (4.3,
SD=2.2), t(50)=.10, p=.92, d=.02, 95% CI [–1.2, 0.7],
consistent with the manipulation changing only the valence and
not the arousal of participants’ mood.
The mean recent influence in the sad condition (.13, SD=.11)
was, as predicted, greater than that in the happy condition (.03,
SD=.16), t(52)=2.54, p=.014, d=.70. The mean distant influence
was not detectably different between sad (–.00, SD=.02) and happy
conditions (.00, SD=.02), t(53)=0.64, p=.47, d=.20, 95% CI on
the difference [–.01, +.01]. A Bayes factor (see Materials and
Methods for explanation) indicated the data for recent influences
provided, relative to the null, strong support for the theory the sad
condition had a higher learning rate than the happy, B=11.86; and
the data for distant influences were neutral between this theory and
the null, B=0.77. Thus, together the data for recent and distant
influences provide strong support for the theory, overall
B=11.86*0.77=9.13. That is, the rate of implicit learning is
sensitive to the use of mood inducing stimuli consistent with the
predictions of the affect-as-information hypothesis (cf also [34]).
Discussion
We introduce a method for measuring learning rate in a very
simple prediction task. Its virtue is its simplicity and the
transparency by which learning rate shows itself. The task is
premised on implicit learning involving a strength of prediction of
an event. Specifically, the method assumes that the strength of
prediction on a given trial can be represented as a weighted mean
of the strength on the previous trial and of what happened on the
current trial. This assumption is a good characterisation of most
models of implicit learning, including the Rescorla-Wagner rule in
associative conditioning, error correction in connectionist net-
works, Kalman filters as used in models of reinforcement learning,
or chunking models in which the strength of a chunk is
incremented less as chunk strength approaches a ceiling
[21,35,36]. The weighting for the current trial is the learning
rate: The more the current trial is weighted, the more impact each
trial has on changing the strength of prediction. The consequence
of such a rule is that strength on a given trial is influenced by past
trials in an exponentially decaying way. The slope of the decay is
governed by learning rate: The larger the learning rate the
stronger the influence of recent trials and the weaker the influence
of past trials. This property of the learning rate can be used to
measure it. To make measurement clear, we also used a random
sequence so the influence of each trial on current predictions does
not need to be adjusted by what happened at other time points;
each trial is independent, thus making computations clean.
We show that people often develop expectations sensitive to
events in the past; that is, there is learning. Further the
phenomenology associated with this learning is largely that
associated with implicit learning [16–18,28,37] (compare [38]
for a similar task). Although people sometimes use conscious rules
and recollections, they largely rely on guessing and intuition.
Further, the learning people show is sensitive to context, consistent
with it being associative.
We illustrate the usefulness of the method by showing it sheds
light on important psychological questions. Paradoxically we argue
that amnesia should be associated with a large learning rate in
Figure 3. Results for testing normal controls. Correlation of current prediction with what happened on the nth trial in the past plotted against
trials into the past (n).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033400.g003
Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e33400certain situations: A large learning rate means a small memory
into the past and this is just what we find with a case study with a
very dense amnesic. Future research could address the conditions
under which amnesia is associated with an especially high or low
learning rate on different versions of the task. According to the
Bayesian approach, learning rates will be adjusted according to the
probabilistic structure and dynamics of the domain (e.g. [39]). On
this approach, people with amnesia may have trouble adjusting
learning rates to deal with domains with learning rates that are
optimally low (i.e. dealing with long time scales), but they will not
in general be quicker than average to implicitly learn (for example,
on a task that optimally has a relatively large learning rate). [40]
found in an implicit spatial context learning task that presenting
subjects first with a block of trials with no regularity to be learned
inhibited subsequent learning of a regularity. Thus, using a
genuinely random sequence may induce low learning rates in
normal people on our task. Future research could explore if
constantly changing the probability of the outcome, e.g. with a
sinusoid, increases learning rate (note that the dependence
between trials would then have to be partialed out to determine
the profile of influence of past trials).
We use the affect-as-information hypothesis to predict that sad
rather than happy moods should be associated with a large learning
rate. Showing people sad faces as stimuli rather than happy ones
indeedproducedalargerlearningrate.Futureresearchcouldusefully
exploretherelationbetweenemotionandlearningrate.Forexample,
canhappyandsadimagesimplicitlygivesuccessandfailurefeedback
independently of mood? Conversely, is mood associated with a
change in learning rate when the target stimuli are emotionally
neutral? We hope these applications motivate other ideas in
researchers. For example, we showed the importance of the valence
ofstimuliinaffectinglearningrate,butwhataboutarousal,whichwe
controlled? In general, how does the rate of learning depend on
differentcontents?Howdoeslearningratevaryovertimeonataskor
with different populations, or by drug induced changes to different
neurotransmitter systems?
A potential weakness of the method is that associative learning is
nottheonlyprocessthatthetaskengages;peoplearealsoliabletothe
gambler’s fallacy [41], as is evident in Figures 1 and 2 for three time
stepsback,andfourtimestepsbackinthecaseofJC,wherethereisa
tendency to predict the opposite to what happened. Overall, this
influenceisweakcomparedtotheeffectofimplicitlearning.Inorder
toensuretheinfluenceofthegambler’sfallacywasdisentangledfrom
implicitlearning,trial-by-trialdecisionswerefitbyamodelconsisting
of a) a Rescorla-Wagner learning device with its learning rate, and
simultaneously b) agambler’s fallacy process withits equivalent rate
parameter (see Materials and Methods). Controlling for gambler’s
fallacyinthisway,JChadanestimatedlearningrateof.80(SD=.14),
stilldetectablyhigherthanthatofcontrols(.63,SD=.32),t(60)=3.01
(df adjusted for unequal variances), p=.004, d=0.69. In fact, there
was no detectable difference in gambler’s fallacy rate parameter
between JC and controls (nor between people in the happy and sad
conditions of the mood experiment). Nonetheless, future research
could usefully explore conditions where the effect of the gambler’s
fallacycouldbemostlyeliminated:Forexample,byusingasituation
more complex than a simple binary choice, by eliciting faster
responses, or by using a cover story indicating the sequence was
generated byhuman skill rather thana mechanical process[41].
The method assumes a learning process in which the enduring
influence of a trial is determined completely by its contribution to
a single overall strength term. But not all models of implicit
learning make this assumption. For example, learning sequences of
locations or musical tones has been successfully modelled with a
‘‘buffer network’’ in which the last n trials are explicitly
represented and used to predict what happens on the next trial
(i.e. there is a buffer of size n). [42–43]. In the models used by
Figure 4. Results for testing JC. Correlation of current prediction with what happened on the nth trial in the past plotted against trials into the
past (n). JC shows a stronger influence of recent trials than normal controls, and normal controls show a stronger influence of distant trials than JC.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033400.g004
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influence in prediction, and any stimulus more than n trials back
would have no influence. While the buffer network (with n=4) was
successful in accounting for the relatively complex tasks of [42,43],
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 show that the influence of past events was
qualitatively different in the current task than the buffer model
predicts. The buffer model could be made to fit the influence
profiles shown in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 by having a large buffer (up to
at least n=7) and adding an assumption that the representation of
a stimulus decays according to n. This would ad hoc fit the data by
brute force. The current method would then not so much measure
learning rate as buffer size or the decay profile within the buffer. It
would be measuring an interesting characteristic of the learning
system, but not directly the learning rate of the component units in
the network.
Another approach to modelling implicit learning that violates
the assumptions of the method is the exemplar approach [44–46],
in which correct responses are stored together with contexts. If a
correct response together with general context (e.g. warning signal)
was stored on each trial, there would be a flat influence profile
back in time, as each time in the past would be equally
represented. If these stored exemplars decayed, then most recent
trials would have more influence, just as we find. In this case the
learning rate measured by our method would reflect the decay rate
of the exemplars.
Future research could examine our task in a more fine-grained
way to determine if a model more complex than simple
accumulating strength is needed to account for performance.
Given the simplicity of the task and the fit of the profiles to such a
simple model (barring the gambler’s fallacy effect), a Rescorla-
Wagner model can be taken as at least an emergent approxima-
tion to the learning system, which defines a level of description to
which we can assign a meaningful learning rate. It will be
interesting to see how far such an approximation takes us, and
what lower level features the measured learning rate reflects, for
example, underlying learning rates of neurons.
Learning is a fundamental process characteristic of much of the
brain; exploring the factors that the rate of learning depends on is
hence a fundamental problem for psychology. It has been
investigated in the animal learning domain, and its generalisation
to people, with respect to particular problems, such as the relative
learning rates of different stimuli of varying salience (over-
shadowing) and effects of predictability or surprise on subsequent
learning rate [47,48]. Here we broaden the scope of the enquiry
and provide a general tool for doing so. We show how exploring
the problem of learning rate in people can produce interesting and
surprising findings.
Materials and Methods
Bayesian analyses
A Bayes factor is useful for indicating continuous degrees of
support for a hypothesis and hence when a null result counts against
a theory that predicts a difference or doesn’t count one way or the
other (see [49,50]). Values around one indicate the data are equally
consistent with both null and experimental hypotheses. Values
greater than one indicate increasing evidence for the experimental
hypothesis and values approaching zero indicate increasing
evidence for the null. [51] regarded Bayes factors of greater than
3 or less than 1/3 as providing substantial evidence. A Bayes factor
requires specification of what effect sizes the theory predicts. We
based these predictions on a pilot study with 59 undergraduate
students predicting whether a square will appear on the left or right.
The mean degree of recent influences was .10, SD=.15, and of
distant influences was .01, standard deviation =.03 (both
significantly above zero). For the mood study, the difference
predicted by theory between happy and sad moods was modelled
with half-normals with a standard deviations equal to the means for
the pilot; i.e. .10 for recent influences and .01 for distant influences.
That is, the theory was taken as predicting differences in the
required direction on the order of magnitude of the obtained pilot
means, with smaller differences being more likely than larger ones.
See [49] and the associated website, http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.
uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm, which provides
explanation and an on-line Bayes factor calculator.
Computational modelling
Trial-by-trial predictions were modelled with a Rescorla-
Wagner learning device that predicted left or right based on one
permanently on unit coding general context. It could have any
learning rate between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.1. Specifically, let what
happened on a trial, S, is coded one if the square was on the right
and 0 if on the left; and the rate parameter be R and the current
strength of prediction for ‘right’ being W, then the error in
prediction was (S – l). W was updated according to: W=W +
R*error.
A gambler’s fallacy process behaved in the same way except if
the stimulus had just appeared on the left it increased the strength
of prediction for right and vice versa; it thus also had a rate
parameter between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.1. Specifically, let what
happened on a trial, S, is coded one if the square was on the right
and 0 if on the left; and the rate parameter be R and the current
strength of prediction for ‘right’ being G, then G was updated
according to: G=R*(1–S) + (1–R)*G.
On each trial the predictions of the two devices were combined
with a weighted mean with a weight p for the Rescorla-Wagner
output (and thus 1–p for the gambler’s fallacy) which also varied
in steps of 0.1 between 0 and 1. That is, the overall strength of
prediction for right was T=p*W + (1–p)*G. Thus the 300 trials
of a given run of the experiment with a person was checked
against the predictions of all 11 X 11 X 11 parameter
combinations and the combination which minimised least mean
square error was chosen as the best fitting parameter set. That is,
error on a given trial was the difference between the subject’s
response on that trial (coded 1 for right and 0 for left) and T. The
error was squared and averaged over all 300 trials to provide a
mean square error for a given model. Because the structure to be
learned is random, and the Rescorla-Wagner and gambler fallacy
processes are opposites, the error space is relatively flat around
the minimum. Thus, this method of determining learning rate is
less sensitive than the main method used in the text (i.e. directly
testing differences in correlations). In other data we have found
that the method becomes sensitive when the structure to be
learned is non-random.
The estimated gambler’s fallacy rate for JC was .46 (SD=.40)
and for normal controls .43 (SD=.35), not detectably different,
t(66)=.28, 95% CI [–.17, .23]. Nonetheless, JC had an estimated
learning rate of .80 (SD=.14), detectably higher than that of
controls (.63, SD=.32), t(60)=3.01 (df adjusted for unequal
variances), p=.004, d=0.69. For the mood study, people in the
happy condition had an estimated gambler’s fallacy rate of .58
(SD=.32) not detectably different from those in the sad condition,
.46 (SD=.37), t(54)=1.24, 95% CI [–.07, .30]. Similarly, people
in the happy condition had an estimated learning rate of .51
(SD=.34) not detectably different from the .63 (SD=.33) of
people in the sad condition, t(54)=1.34, though in the right
direction and the confidence interval is wide in the predicted
direction, [–.30, .06].
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